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Washington enacted a malicious harassment statute' in
1989 in response to the growing number of incidents of hate
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School of Law.
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080 (1989) provides:
(1) A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he maliciously and with the
intent to intimidate or harass another person because of, or in a way that is
reasonably related to, associated with, or directed toward, that person's race,
color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or mental, physical or sensory
handicap;
(a) Causes physical injury to another person; or
(b) By words or conduct places another person in reasonable fear of harm
to his person or property or harm to the person or property of a third person.
Such words or conduct include, but are not limited to, (i) cross burning, (ii)
painting, drawing, or depicting symbols or words on the property of the victim
when the symbols or words historically or traditionally connote hatred or
threats toward the victim, or (iii) written or oral communication designed to
intimidate or harass because of, or in a way that is reasonably related to,
associated with, or directed toward, that person's race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap. However,
it does not constitute malicious harassment for a person to speak or act in a
critical, insulting, or deprecatory way unless the context or circumstances
surrounding the words or conduct places another person in reasonable fear of
harm to his or her person or property or harm the person or property of a
third person; or
(c) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of another
person.
(2) The following constitute per se violations of this section:
(a) Cross burning, or
(b) Defacement to the property of the victim or a third person with
symbols or words when the symbols or words historically or traditionally
connote hatred or threats toward the victim.
(3) Malicious harassment is a class C felony.
(4) In addition to the criminal penalty provided in subsection (3) of this
section, there is hereby created a civil cause of action for malicious
harassment. A person may be liable to the victim of malicious harassment for
actual damages and punitive damages of up to ten thousand dollars.
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crimes2 occurring within the state. Statutes similar to Wash-
ington's have been adopted in a number of other states.3 The
only states that have not enacted some form of hate crime leg-
islation are Arkansas, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming.4
Many of the states that have enacted hate crime legisla-
tion, including Washington, specifically refer to the act of cross
burning.' Cross burning incidents are currently on the rise in
Washington. In fact, the most recent and controversial cases
invoking Washington's malicious harassment statute have all
involved cross burning.6
Because the recent controversy over Washington's mali-
cious harassment statute has centered on cases involving cross
burning incidents, the act of cross burning "with the intent to
intimidate or harass"7 will be used as an example of a hate
crime throughout this Comment. This is not to say that other
hate crimes are of lesser importance than cross burning. It is
clear that numerous symbols and words can, because of their
historical context, equally communicate the same messages of
hatred and violence.'
Hate crimes, such as cross burning, are qualitatively differ-
(5) The penalties provided in this section for malicious harassment do not
preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available
under the law.
2. See Daniel Golman, As Bias Crime Seems to Rise, Scientists Study Roots of
Racism, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1990, at C1 (stating that hate crimes have increased since
1988).
3. The following states make cross burning or the burning of other religious
symbols subject to criminal sanction: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58(c)
(West 1986); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3112.2(a) (Supp. 1987); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.17-18 (West 1976); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (1987);
Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 10A (1988); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:33-10
(West 1982); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.12 (1986); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-53-2 (Supp. 1987); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-7-120 (Law. Co-op.
1987); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1982 and Supp. 1987).
4. Rorie Sherman, Hate Crimes Statutes Abound, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 1990, at 3.
5. See statutes cited supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, No. 91-8-02530-6 (King County Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1991),
petition for cert. filed, No. 58734-5 (Wash. Nov. 20, 1991); State v. Talley, No. 91-1-
02001-5 (King County Super. Ct. July 31, 1991), petition for cert. filed, No. 58492-3
(Wash. Aug. 29, 1991).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080(1) (1989). The term "cross burning" will be used
throughout this Comment. However, the reader should understand that the Author is
at all times referring specifically to cross burnings "with the intent to intimidate or
harass." Id. This distinction is significant because cross burning "with the intent to
intimidate or harass" is the specific type of cross burning that is subject to sanction
under Section (1) of Washington's malicious harassment statute.
8. The historical context of certain words (e.g., "nigger," "faggot," "gook") make
their utterance in some situations the communication of a threat of violence.
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ent from other crimes because the perpetrator's conduct harms
not only the direct victim, but other individuals indirectly as
well. When a cross is burned in front of an African-Ameri-
can's home, a message is sent both to that individual and to the
entire African-American community. The message is under-
stood, based on the history of cross burning, as a threat of
future harm.9
The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith has found
that cross burning and other hate crimes may
effectively intimidate other members of the victim's cornmu-
nity, leaving them feeling isolated, vulnerable, and unpro-
tected by the law. By making members of minority
communities fearful, angry, and suspicious of other groups-
and of the power structure that is supposed to protect
them-these incidents can damage the fabric of our society
and fragment communities.' 0
Despite the damaging effects of hate crimes, some argue
that cross burning with the intent to intimidate or harass is
nonetheless deserving of First Amendment protection. The
argument is that hate speech, as communication, cannot be
sanctioned by the government unless a fight or lawless action
is imminent." Moreover, even the regulation of unprotected
speech, such as fighting words, is deemed impermissible if the
regulation is based on the speech's nonproscribable content. 2
The first section of this Comment will briefly discuss how
Washington's malicious harassment statute should be inter-
preted in light of the recent United States Supreme Court case
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.'3 In that case, the Court held that a
City of St. Paul hate crimes ordinance was unconstitutional.
14
Similarly, the history of swastika drawing can make this particular act threatening to
certain individuals.
9. The threat of future violence is but one message communicated through cross
burning. If cross burning with the intent to intimidate, harass, or threaten is not
legislatively proscribed, the perception is that such behavior is condoned by the
government. This makes victims and their communities feel helpless in the system
that was meant to protect them. See generally Richard Delgado, Words that Wound:
A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 133, 137-39 (1982).
10. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RrrH, HATE CRIMES: POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (1988) [hereinafter B'NAI B'RITH].
11. FRANKLIN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 97-99 (1981).
12. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543 (1992).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2542.
1992)
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Rather than deciding the case on the obvious issues of over-
breadth and vagueness, the Court held that the ordinance was
impermissibly content-based.'"
Under the Court's reasoning, Washington's malicious har-
assment statute will probably be found unconstitutional. 6
Such a finding, however, will merely lead to the drafting of a
content-neutral statute through the use of a catch all phrase.'7
Even with the addition of this phrase, however, the statute will
still be subject to attack. Accordingly, the next round of criti-
cisms will focus on the issues of overbreadth and vagueness,
issues to which the Supreme Court has not provided guidance.
Because the issues of overbreadth and vagueness are of
such imminent importance, an analysis of those issues will
form the majority of this Comment. Both issues, as mentioned
above, will be discussed in terms of the specific crime of cross
burning with the intent to intimidate or harass as proscribed
by Section (1) of Washington's malicious harassment statute.'8
In discussing the issue of overbreadth, a determination
must be made as to whether cross burning with the intent to
intimidate or harass is even "expressive conduct." This author
contends that such acts are not speech, but merely threats of
violence that can be freely regulated by the government.
Under this interpretation, Section (1) of Washington's statute
is not overly broad because it proscribes only non-speech.
If cross burning with the intent to intimidate or harass is
interpreted as expressive conduct, the constitutional analysis
will be different, but the end result is nevertheless that such
conduct is sanctionable. This is because cross burning with the
intent to intimidate or harass can be construed as encompass-
ing only "fighting words," threatening speech,'9 or low value
15. Id.
16. See infra note 19 for an interpretation that avoids the impact of KA. V.
17. RA. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553. Ironically, this phrase will merely ensure that the
statute covers problems that the legislature has initially determined do not exist.
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080(1) (1991).
19. This Comment will emphasize that cross burning with the intent to intimidate
or harass is threatening behavior. Whether threats of violence should be considered
unprotected speech or nonspeech has yet to be decided.
In RA V., the Supreme Court decided that fighting words were unprotected
speech, not merely proscribable conduct. As speech, these words could not be made
sanctionable based on the particular views the speakers decided to convey. R.A.V., 112
S. Ct. at 2549. The Court, while making a determination with regard to fighting words,
did not address the same issue in the context of threats of violence.
If cross burning with the intent to intimidate or harass is a merely a threat
(proscribable conduct), then the statute is not overly broad. More importantly, critics
[Vol. 16:373
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speech, all of which are subject to legitimate criminalization.
Under the previous interpretations, Section (1) of Washing-
ton's statute survives criticisms of overbreadth because it sanc-
tions only unprotected speech.
Issues of overbreadth aside, Section (1) of the statute may
be criticized on vagueness grounds. For example, some argue
that the wording is unclear as to what extent the perpetrator
must be motivated by the victim's ethnicity. This criticism is
without merit. The most logical interpretation of the statute is
that the victim's ethnicity must have been at least a substantial
reason why the perpetrator acted.
Another potential criticism of the statute is that the word-
ing "places another person in reasonable fear of harm . . ." is
vague, because neither a subjective nor an objective standard is
specifically mentioned. This criticism, however, is easily over-
come because Washington uses a mixed standard in such
circumstances.
Considering the concrete and real harms minority victims
of hate crimes experience, there is a tremendous need for a
malicious harassment statute. With this in mind, Washington's
statute should be construed, whenever possible, in a way that
preserves its constitutionality.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF R.A. V. V. CITY OF ST. PAUL:
UNDERBREADTH
In its June 22, 1992, opinion, the United States Supreme
Court held a City of St. Paul hate crimes ordinance 20 unconsti-
tutional. 1 Despite claims of overbreadth and vagueness, the
of the statute could not make "content-based" arguments, because only non-speech
would be proscribed.
The Supreme Court's reasoning wth regard to fighting words, however, could
arguably be applied by analogy to the context of threatening behavior. This Author
has therefore decided to alternatively discuss actions proscribable under Washington's
statute as threatening speech. The reader should note, however, that the case law is
presently equivocal on this issue. The cases use the word "threat," and do not give any
explanation as to whether these threats are communicative or not.
20. The City of St. Paul ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
CITY OF ST. PAUL MINN. LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
21. R.A V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
1992]
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Court never reached these issues. In fact, regarding the issue
of overbreadth, the Court simply stated that it was bound by
prior Minnesota decisions construing the language "arouses
alarm or resentment in others" as referring only to fighting
words.22
Rather than analyzing the most apparent issues, the Court
held that the City of St. Paul's hate crimes ordinance was
unconstitutional based on the new doctrine of "under-
breadth.'2' The majority, led by Justice Scalia, stated that the
ordinance impermissibly sanctioned some fighting words but
not others.24 This selective proscription, argued the Court, was
based on the particular views the "speakers" decided to convey,
and was therefore an impermissible regulation of ideas.'
Although the majority's reasoning in R.A. V. has numerous
shortfalls,26 Washington courts are nevertheless bound by the
opinion." Challenging Washington's statute as underinclusive,
however, does not end the discussion. As Justice White stated
in his concurring opinion, the underbreadth problem can easily
be cured by adding a catch-all phrase such as "and all other
fighting words that may constitutionally be subject to this
ordinance."'
Even with Washington's malicious harassment statute
reworded to conform with R.A. V., constitutional criticisms will
nevertheless exist. The statute will still be subject to attack
concerning the issues of overbreadth and vagueness. Regard-
22. Id.
23. In Justice White's concurring opinion, he states that the majority has
employed the new doctrine of "underbreadth." Id. at 2553.
24. Id. at 2547. Namely, the ordinance was directed only toward those fighting
words based on the victim's race, color, religion, or gender. Id.
25. RA. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
26. Specifically, the majority's analysis failed to realize that the regulation of ideas
was neither the aim nor the result of the City of St. Paul ordinance. The wording
"race, color, creed, religion or gender" was not used to censor politically incorrect
speech. Rather, the ordinance was directed at the peculiar injuries members of
minority groups face when confronted with hate speech.
Considering the historical context of many forms of hate speech, such acts are
perceived by victims as threats of violence. These threats are pervasive and
understood not only by direct victims, but also by their communities. Hate crimes are
specifically sanctioned because such acts are qualitatively different from other crimes.
Hate crimes do not communicate ideas, but rather, place entire communities in fear of
potential violence.
27. See supra note 19 for an alternative interpretation that could arguably escape
the impact of R.A V.
28. KA V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
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ing both issues, the Supreme Court has yet to provide
guidance.
III. ADDRESSING THE REAL ISSUES: OVERBREADTH
AND VAGUENESS
Part A of this Comment will focus on the yet to be decided
issues of overbreadth and vagueness, with an emphasis on the
way they affect Section (1) of Washington's statute. In discuss-
ing Section (1), cross burning with the intent to intimidate or
harass will continue to be used as an example of a hate crime.
Part B of this Comment will focus on Section (2)(a) of
Washington's statute, which also proscribes cross burning.
This section, however, makes no reference to the perpetrator's
intent and is therefore overly broad. A remedy for this consti-
tutional deficiency will be provided.
A. Analysis of Section (1)
1. Cross Burning with the Intent to Intimidate or Harass as
Non-Expressive Conduct
In order to determine whether Washington's malicious
harassment statute impermissibly restricts freedom of speech,
the first step is to determine whether cross burning with the
intent to intimidate or harass is even expressive conduct. The
Supreme Court supplied the test for making this determina-
tion: "[There must be an] intent to convey a particularized
message . . . and the likelihood [must be great] that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it." '
Using this test, those who oppose the criminalization of
cross burning may argue that all cross burnings constitute
expressive conduct because the message of white supremacy is
invariably conveyed. It is argued that crosses are used, rather
than other objects, because the burning of a cross connotes par-
ticular racial and political views. Thus, although these views
may be distasteful, they are nevertheless afforded protection
under both the First Amendment 0 and Article 1, Section 5 of
29. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
30. See id. at 397. In Texas v. Johnson, the Court held that while flag burning
may have been offensive to some, the act itself was still protected under the First
Amendment. Id. at 409. The Court held that flag burning did not threaten a breach of
the peace nor constitute "fighting words." Id. See also Eichman v. United States, 496
U.S. 310 (1990) (offensive flag burning nonetheless protected speech); Cohen v.
1992]
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the Washington Constitution.3'
Proponents of hate crime legislation obviously disagree
with the above analysis. Some have gone as far as to say that
all cross burnings, regardless of the demonstrator's intent,
"have no meaning on their own, but [rather], convey a power-
ful message to both the user and the recipient of the sign in
context.
32
Section (1) of Washington's malicious harassment statute
does not adopt an approach that is so far-reaching. Rather, the
statute was enacted to regulate acts, such as cross burning,
only when the perpetrator has the intent to intimidate or har-
ass and only when the victim is placed in reasonable fear of
harm to person or property. The statute, written this way,
does not regulate cross burnings that constitute expressive con-
duct. For example, burning a cross on a movie set or burning a
cross during a demonstration would not invoke the statute.
Only when cross burning is used to intimidate or harass (i.e.,
threaten) does the statute apply.
When cross burning is used to threaten another individual,
the message of white supremacy merely has a residual impact
on the victim. The victim experiences fear and the threat of
further violence long before the message of white supremacy is
ever communicated.3 3 Cross burning loses its communicative
value when the perpetrator intends to intimidate or harass and
where the victim is reasonably placed in fear of harm. This
particular type of cross burning is meant first and foremost to
be a threat. Courts, therefore, should construe such cross
burnings as threats, devoid of any real message, and thus sanc-
tionable by the government.
The goal of Washington's malicious harassment statute is
to protect minority citizens from hateful intimidation; it is not
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (words "Fuck the Draft" on individual's jacket not a
direct personal insult).
31. See generally O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash. 2d 796, 749 P.2d 142 (1988).
32. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speeck" Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2365 (1989).
33. Free speech presumes the presence of rational dialogue. Professor Tribe has
noted the difference between words that leave room for reply and words that trigger
action or cause harm without the opportunity for response. Only the former is
protected communication. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-8, at 837 (2d ed. 1988).
Hate crimes, such as certain forms of cross burning, can be seen as "a blow, not a
proffered idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely that dialogue will follow."
Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 452.
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intended to stifle offensive communication. 34 Other states
throughout the country have similarly legislated against cross
burning with the intent to intimidate or harass35 primarily
because such acts constitute "terroristic threat[s]"'  and are not
an exercise of free speech.37 For instance, Georgia convicted a
cross burner under its hate crimes statute and declared that
the perpetrator's action was not constitutionally protected
under the First Amendment.38 In that case, the court stated
that while the First Amendment does protect the advocacy of
certain ideas, "it does not extend to the threatening of terror,
inciting of riots, or placing another's life or property in
danger."39
Cross burning with the intent to intimidate or harass
should be regulated as a threat and should not be considered a
form of communication. The need for a malicious harassment
statute stems not only from the fact that victims should be pro-
tected from these threats, but also from the fact that current
statutes do not provide adequate protection.4 °
34. Washington's malicious harassment statute provides:
[I]t does not constitute malicious harassment for a person to speak or act in a
critical, insulting, or deprecatory way unless the context or circumstances
surrounding the words or conduct places another person in reasonable fear of
harm to his person or property or person or property of a third person.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080(1)(b) (1989). Note that the statute requires an intent to
intimidate or harass, as well as placing the "reasonable" victim in fear of harm. Id.
35. See statutes cited supra note 3 for states that proscribe cross burning or the
burning of other religious symbols.
36. State v. Miller, 629 P.2d 748, 751 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (cross burning may fall
within purview of terroristic threat statute depending on circumstances).
37. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Koch, 431 A.2d 1052, 1057 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1981).
38. Masson v. Slaton, 320 F. Supp. 699, 672 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
39. Id.
40. Those opposed to the criminalization of cross burning argue that other statutes
exist which provide adequate protection for victims of hate crimes. For example,
victims can be protected under the state's trespass, assault, and harassment statutes.
These statutes, however, do not provide protection to victims in particular
circumstances. For instance, a cross burning occurring off the property of the victim,
yet near her home, will certainly place that victim in tremendous fear; however, a
trespass remedy may not be afforded because the incident did not take place on the
victim's property. An assault remedy is also unlikely because the harm is not
"imminent."
While some argue that malicious harassment statutes impermissibly punish the
perpetrator's motive, as well as the underlying crime, this simply is not true.
Malicious harassment statutes are needed because this crime is wholly separate from
the crime of harassment. While both harassment statutes and malicious harassment
statutes, by definition, require direct threats to the victim, the crime of malicious
harassment has a threatening effect on the victim's entire community as well. B'NAI
B'RrIH, supm note 10, at 1.
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a. Cross Burning and Flag Burning: The Differences
Those who oppose the criminal sanctioning of cross burn-
ing with the intent to intimidate or harass argue that it is sub-
stantially similar to flag burning, which the United States
Supreme Court has held to be expressive conduct under the
First Amendment.4 1 There are, however, several critical dif-
ferences between cross burning and flag burning.
Specifically, the flag burning cases dealt with demonstra-
tions that occurred in public. 2 Furthermore, the demonstra-
tions were not directed at particular individuals, but rather,
were in opposition to more general concerns.43 In contrast,
cross burnings with the intent to intimidate or harass are not
public activities. Such acts generally occur on or near the
property of a minority individual or family." Furthermore,
the perpetrators usually do not burn crosses to express their
general opinions. Their actions are directed at specific individ-
uals and the goal is to intimidate or harass.45
The flag burning cases stand for the proposition that pub-
lic flag burning used as a means to express political views is
protected by the First Amendment. 46 The cases do not support
the proposition that persons may burn objects with an intent to
41. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989); Eichman v. United States, 496 U.S.
310, 319 (1990).
42. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399 (American flag burned on steps of Dallas
City Hall); Eichman, 496 U.S. at 310 (American flags burned on steps of United States
Capitol).
43. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399 (flag burned to protest policies of Reagan
administration); Eichman, 496 U.S. at 312 (flags burned to protest "aspects of the
Government's domestic and foreign policy").
44. Cross burnings often occur in situations where the degree of captivity makes it
impossible for the victim to avoid exposure. Where cross burning intrudes on the
privacy of the home, this act may be subject to governmental regulation. See
Enznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). There is no right to force
"speech" into the home of an unwilling listener. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85
(1988).
In U.S. v. Lee, 935 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1991), a cross was burned outside an
apartment complex where a number of African-Americans lived. Though there was
no trespass, the residents who viewed the cross felt fearful. Id. at 954. The court
stated that such acts were not mere advocacy, but rather, overt acts of intimidation,
which, because of their historical context, "are often a precursor to or a promise of
violence against black people." Id. Furthermore, the court noted that such cross
burning is an especially intrusive act that invades the privacy interests of its victims.
Thus, the court concluded as follows: "mo protect the inhabitants of this nation from
such an attack on civil rights does not violate the spirit of the first amendment." Id.
(emphasis added).
45. See generally, Matsuda, supra note 32.
46. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397; Eichman, 496 U.S. at 319.
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intimidate, harass, terrorize, or threaten." In fact, acts nor-
mally regarded as "expressive conduct"" lose their expressive
character and become threats when accompanied by an intent
to intimidate or harass.4 9 Where expressive conduct is solely
motivated to threaten, injure or terrorize others, it does not
fall within the protection of the First Amendment.'
b. Distinguishing the Statutory Language
Washington's malicious harassment statute has been erro-
neously analogized to a Texas statute that proscribed protected
expression.51 Specifically, the Texas statute forbad a person to
"desecrate... a state or national flag. '52 The term "desecrate"
was defined as meaning to "deface, damage or otherwise physi-
cally mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously
offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his
actions. ' 53  Thus, in order for liability to attach, the violator
must have had the intent to offend.'M Washington's statute, in
contrast, specifically prohibits burning a cross with the intent
to intimidate or harass.'
Offensive actions may have communicative value,
56
47. Cross burning on or near the property of a victim is considered an intimidating
action that is not worthy of First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Lee, 935 F.2d at 954.
48. For example, burning a cross on a movie set or during a demonstration or
march.
49. For example, burning a cross during a march communicates notions of white
supremacy and intolerance of diversity. However, when a cross is burned on the lawn
of an African-American family's home, the family's initial reaction is one of fear-fear
of being physically hurt, fear of being run out of the neighborhood, fear of continuing
threats, etc. The message of white supremacy and intolerance of diversity is merely
secondary to the threat. Fear is experienced long before any other messages are
understood. See generally Lee, 935 F.2d 952.
50. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
51. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (West 1989) provides in full:
Sec. 42.09 Desecration of Venerated Object
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag;
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means deface, damage, or
otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously
offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his actions.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
52. Id. § 42.09(a)(3).
53. Id. § 42.09(b).
54. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 (1989).
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080(1) (1991).
56. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding ordinance
19921
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whereas intimidating or harassing actions do not.57 For exam-
ple, in Collin v. Smith,58 despite the fact that many Jewish res-
idents of Skokie, Illinois, were offended by the sight of Nazis
marching through town in uniform, the Nazis were neverthe-
less allowed to proceed. 9 The march was considered protected
speech under the First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution."0 If the marchers had decided to wield stones at the
homes of nearby Jewish residents, yelling anti-Semetic
remarks, the marchers' conduct would certainly no longer
have been entitled to protection. This is because the line sepa-
rating offensive speech from threats of violence would have
been crossed.
Washington's statute has been tailored such that offensive
speech is not sanctionable. The legislature recognized that
offensive speech is protected, and the statute specifically pro-
vides that merely speaking in a "critical, insulting, or depreca-
tory way" does not constitute malicious harassment."1 What
the statute prohibits is physical injury, property damage, and
words or conduct that would place another in reasonable fear
of harm to person or property.62 Protected expression is there-
fore not prohibited.
2. The Issue of Overbreadth: Cross Burning with the Intent
to Intimidate or Harass as Expressive Conduct
Despite the preceding arguments, cross burning with the
intent to intimidate or harass may nevertheless be viewed by
some as "expressive conduct." The residual message of white
supremacy, which accompanies the threat of violence inherent
in many cross burning situations, is argued to be a communica-
tion worthy of First Amendment protection. As expressive
conduct, cross burning with the intent to intimidate or harass
unconstitutional as applied to demonstrators wearing uniforms and displaying
swastikas in Jewish neighborhood).
57. See infra note 33.
58. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1979).
59. Id. at 1200. Some may argue that the Jewish residents were intimidated and
placed in fear as a result of the march. The line between offensive and intimidating
conduct is thus difficult to draw. Despite this, the marchers did not have an intent to
intimidate. Instead, their intent was to communicate a message, and perhaps even to
offend, but no more. Under Washington's malicious harassment statute, therefore, the
marchers' conduct would not be sanctionable. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080(1)
(1989).
60. See Collin, 578 F.2d at 1201-02.




can only be criminalized if the substantive evil caused by its
communicative impact rises "above public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest."'
As expressive conduct, cross burning with the intent to
intimidate or harass generally cannot be criminally sanctioned
unless it falls into one of three exceptions: (1) fighting
words;" (2) clear and present danger of incitement to immi-
nent lawless action;' or (3) the O'Brien standard, which pro-
vides that incidental limitations on speech are permissible if
there is an important governmental interest implicated unre-
lated to the suppression of free speech."
While the previously named exceptions are the most well-
known, there are others. For example, threats of violence are
also not afforded First Amendment protection.67  This is
because symbolic conduct solely motivated to threaten another
individual does not support any of the policies of the First
Amendment such as the free exchange of ideas.'
Another example of communication that may not be
afforded full First Amendment protection is "low value"
speech.6" "Low value" speech generally has little social value
in relation to its potential harm, and it is thus more freely
regulable by the government.70
The following discussion will focus on the doctrine of over-
breadth as interpreted by both the federal and Washington
State Constitutions. Under either standard, Washington's
malicious harassment statute is not overly broad as only unpro-
tected speech is proscribed. This is because the Washington
63. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963).
64. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
65. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
66. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
67. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969); State v. Miller, 629
P.2d 748 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
68. See TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-8, at 837.
69. The phrase "low-value speech" was not coined by the United States Supreme
Court, but is neverthless used by professors and practitioners to describe those
expressions that are not afforded full First Amendment protection. Some examples of
low-value speech are obscenity, child pornography, and libel.
70. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography
physiologically, emotionally, and mentally harms children and has no serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity
caters to the prurient interest and is patently offensive without any serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value); New York Times v. Sullivan, 377 U.S. 254 (1964)
(libel injures reputation and does not advance truth).
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statute can logically be construed to encompass only fighting
words, threatening speech, or low value speech.
a. Federal Overbreadth Analysis
The doctrine of overbreadth is a constitutional safeguard
which ensures that laws do not sweep within their condemna-
tion "speech which our Constitution has immunized from gov-
ernment control."'" The assumption, however, is that the
statute in question is constitutional.72
Under the First Amendment, statutes regulating conduct
cannot be stricken as overbroad "unless the overbreadth is
both real and substantial in relation to the ordinance's plainly
legitimate sweep."73 Thus, under the First Amendment, a law
should not be voided on its face unless its deterrence of pro-
tected activities is substantial.74 The United States Supreme
Court stated as follows:
Because of the wide-reaching effects of striking down a stat-
ute on its face at the request of one whose own conduct may
be punished despite the First Amendment, we have recog-
nized that the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine" and
have employed it with hesitation, and then only as last
resort.75
Under the First Amendment, a narrowly drafted statute is
not vulnerable on its face simply because occasional applica-
tions can be imagined to go beyond constitutional bounds.76 A
statute must reach a substantial amount of protected activity
when compared to its legitimate sweep in order to be found
overly broad.77
The United States Supreme Court has stated that poten-
tially overbroad statutes should be narrowly construed if possi-
ble.7 The Court is reluctant to strike down a statute
71. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
72. See generally Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.
73. Id. at 770.
74. Id. at 769. Generally, trespass and breach of the peace statutes are not found
overly broad by the Court because these laws are rarely applied to protected speech.
Rather, in cases involving trespass or breach of the peace, unprotected behavior is
sanctioned far more often than protected expression. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-8, at
1024-25.
75. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769.
76. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
77. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-18 (1973).
78. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769.
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altogether because of its potential to deter protected expres-
sion. In fact, the Court has shown a great willingness to allow
state courts to narrow statutes in the application process.79
b. Washington's Overbreadth Analysis
Washington's Constitution is less tolerant than the First
Amendment and appears to provide a more strict analysis in
cases of overbreadth.8s Under the Washington Constitution,
Article 1, Section 5, the "substantial" requirement does not
apply.81 Prior restraints on constitutionally protected expres-
sion are prohibited under "any circumstances. '8 2 The reason
why the overbreadth doctrine has been extended in Washing-
ton is because overly broad statutes have been found to
threaten individuals who are not immediately before the court.
That is, others may refrain from engaging in legally protected
activities because they fear prosecution under an overly broad
statute.8 3
While Washington has effectively done away with the
"substantiality" requirement, courts should not construe all
statutes that tangentially prohibit protected speech as uncon-
stitutional. Arguably, the "any circumstances" language
employed by Washington courts is not meant to be taken liter-
ally. If it were, numerous statutes would be found unconstitu-
tional as overly broad. For example, in applying this language
literally, a breach of the peace statute would certainly be found
unconstitutional because numerous hypothetical situations can
be imagined where such a statute would violate an individual's
constitutional rights.' Similarly, a trespass statute could also
be struck down on its face if the "any circumstances" language
were taken literally.'
79. Id at 768.
80. O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash. 2d 796, 804, 749 P.2d 142, 147 (1988).
81. Id. at 804, 749 P.2d at 147.
82. Id.
83. See generally Board of Airport Comm'rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S.
569, 574 (1982).
84. For example, a demonstrator may be communicating protected expression
while at the same time causing a disturbance that rises to the level of a breach of the
peace. Arresting this person will solve the breach of the peace problem. However, the
police officer's conduct will also have the collateral effect of preventing that person
from communicating what is on her mind. Despite the fact that protected speech is
incidentally affected, the breach of the peace statute would most likely not be struck
down as overly broad.
85. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-28, at 1024-25. For example, a group of individuals
may be involved in a peaceful demonstration. Part of the demonstration, however,
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Washington courts may find statutes overly broad, and
thus unconstitutional, in situations where the prohibition of
protected conduct is less than substantial. However, the courts
may not find statutes unconstitutional simply because there
are some incidental limitations of free speech. 8Y As of yet,
Washington courts have not determined at what point a statute
should be deemed overly broad. Considering the merits of the
"substantiality" doctrine though, the standard should not stray
far from this norm.
c. A Permissible Application of the Overbreadth Doctrine
Statutes that incidentally regulate free speech should not
be found invalid. When faced with an overly broad statute, the
appropriate course of action is to adopt a narrow construction
so that only unprotected speech is regulated.8 7 In the recent
case, In the Matter of the Welfare of R.A. V,' the Supreme
Court of Minnesota narrowly construed an ordinance censor-
ing "displays one knows or should know will create anger,
alarm or resentment based on racial, ethnic, gender or reli-
gious bias."8 9 Specifically, the court ruled that the City of St.
Paul's hate crimes ordinance 9° was not overly broad if it were
construed to encompass only "fighting words."9'
The Minnesota Supreme Court compared the case before
it with Texas v. Johnson and drew the following distinction:
Unlike the flag desecration statute at issue in Texas v. John-
son, the challenged City of St. Paul ordinance does not on its
may occur on the property of a person who does not wish to have numerous people
stomping across her lawn. The demonstrators, who are espousing constitutionally
protected speech, are nevertheless trespassing. Although prosecution under the state's
trespass statute may have some incidental ramifications on the demonstrators' ability
to communicate their concerns, the statute cannot be challenged as overly broad.
86. Otherwise, many statutes would be found unconstitutional, e.g., statutes
prohibiting trespass or a breach of the peace.
87. In the Matter of the Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1991).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 508-09.
90. The City of St. Paul ordinance provided as follows:
Disorderly Conduct. Whoever places on public or private property a symbol,
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed or religion commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
CITY OF ST. PAUL MINN. LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
91. In the Matter of the Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 509.
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face assume that any cross burning, irrespective of the par-
ticular context in which it occurs, is subject to prosecution.
Rather the ordinance censors only those displays that one
knows or should know will create anger, alarm or resent-
ment based on racial, ethnic, gender or religious bias.92
Like the City of St. Paul ordinance, Section (1) of Wash-
ington's malicious harassment statute does not proscribe all
cross burning. The statute prohibits cross burning only where
the perpetrator intends to use this conduct as a means to
intimidate or harass a particular individual.9 3 Furthermore,
the perpetrator's words or conduct must also have reasonably
placed the victim in fear of harm to his or her person or
property. 4
Washington's malicious harassment statute recognizes that
cross burning in some situations is an expression of an anti-
social attitude that should be afforded First Amendment pro-
tection; racial bigotry, however insidious, is protected speech.9 5
However, the statute also recognizes that "[r]esorts to epithets
or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution ..... 9
Washington's malicious harassment statute takes note of this
distinction and explicitly states the following:
[I]t does not constitute malicious harassment for a person to
speak or act in a critical, insulting, or deprecatory way
unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words
places another person in reasonable fear of harm to his per-
son or property or harm to the person or property of a third
person.97
Washington's malicious harassment statute, which pros-
cribes cross burning with the intent to intimidate or harass, is
subject to three constructions, all of which preserve the stat-
ute's constitutionality.
First, the statute can be construed to apply only to fighting
words. Critics argue that this construction is impossible
because "the intent to intimidate or harass is the polar opposite
92. 1d& at 510.
93. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.080(1) (1989).
94. rd. § 9A.36.080(1)(b).
95. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
96. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
97. WAsH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080(1)(b) (1989).
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of the intent to provoke a fight or other disturbance ....
The following discussion demonstrates, however, that the
fighting words exception specifically contemplates both direct
personal insults and words that by their very utterance inflict
injury."
Second, the statute can be narrowly construed to sanction
only threatening speech. The term "intimidation," though not
defined in the statute, should be interpreted in its common
legal usage: "putting in fear."''  "Harassment" is specifically
defined in the Revised Code of Washington (RCW)
9A.46.020(1) as "(i) knowingly threatening to cause bodily
injury or physical damage and (ii) by words or conduct placing
the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will
be carried out."10 Based on the plain language of these defini-
tions, Washington's malicious harassment statute can be nar-
rowly interpreted to encompass only threatening speech.
Finally, the conduct proscribed in the statute may be
deemed low-value speech. This is because the communicative
value of cross burning with the intent to intimidate or harass is
de minimis in relation to the harm that such conduct produces.
i. Narrowly Construed to Fit Within the Fighting
Words Exception
Of the three well-known exceptions to free speech protec-
tion, cross burning with the intent to intimidate or harass
arguably fits within only one: fighting words. Fighting words
have traditionally been viewed as encompassing a small class of
expressive conduct that is "likely to provoke the average per-
son to retaliate and thereby cause a breach of the peace. '"1°2
While fighting words are generally thought of in terms of "an
invitation to exchange fisticuffs,"'0 3 this is only one interpreta-
tion. The United States Supreme Court has noted that fighting
words encompass words "which by their very utterance inflict
injury ... ."I' Furthermore, the Court has also described
98. State v. Stevens, No. 91-&02530-6, slip op. at 8 (King County Super. Ct. Oct. 9,
1991), petition for cert. filed, No. 58734-5 (Wash. Nov. 20, 1991).
99. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
100. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 821 (6th ed. 1990).
101. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.46.020(1) (1989).
102. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.
103. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (citations omitted).
104. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S, at 572 (emphasis added).
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fighting words as including a "direct personal insult."'1 5
In any case involving hate crimes, the Court should take a
more expansive view of the fighting words doctrine. Cur-
rently, the interpretation is male-centered' and ill-suited to
deal with contexts in which malicious harassment is an
issue.1
0 7
Because racist epithets and symbols have a psychological
impact on people who have experienced racial oppression,'08
such "speech" may "intimidate the victim rather than provoke
him or her to violence."' ' The effect of dehumanizing racist
speech is often flight rather than fight, with many victims
choosing to avoid racist encounters instead of escalating the
conflict."'
In many cross burning situations, the directness of the
intimidation is so great that the victim will not fight back. A
victim's decision to respond through silence and admirable self-
restraint should not define the perpetrator's conduct as nonac-
tionable. 11' The perpetrator's intent, not the victim's response,
should be the focus of judicial inquiry.
A more expansive approach to the fighting words excep-
tion weighs the two competing rights-the right to communi-
cate racist ideas and the right to be free from intimidation-
rather than initially favoring the rights of the speaker." 2
Under the new approach, neither right starts with an advan-
tage. Instead, the expansive approach protects racist speech
only to the extent that it does not constitute a direct assault on
another individual.
105. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added).
106. Matsuda, supra note 32, at 2355.
107. The current interpretation of fighting words can be criticized as assuming "an
encounter between two persons of relatively equal power who have been acculturated
to respond to face-to-face insults with violence." Lawrence, supra note 33, at 453-54.
108. As explained by the Sixth Circuit, "a black American [is] particularly
susceptible to the threat of a cross burning because of the historical connotations of
violence associated with the act." United States v. Sayler, 893 F.2d 113, 116 (6th Cir.
1989). Therefore, because the history of violence against African-Americans is
symbolized through the burning of a cross, perpetrators use this symbol precisely
because it makes victims "most vulnerable to the threat of intimidation." Id.
109. Ernest A. Young, Regulation of Racist Speech. In Re Welfare of R.A.V., 464
N.W. 2D 507 (Minn. 1991), 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 903, 908 (1991) (emphasis
addded).
110. Matsuda, supra note 32, at 2356.
111. Id.
112. This is because requiring the "reasonable person" to retaliate is a high
standard for the victim to overcome.
1992]
392 University of Puget Sound Law Review
ii. Narrowly Construed to Apply Only to
Threatening Speech
Cross burnings, as expressive conduct, may also be denied
protection if the "speech" constitutes a threat.113 A threat
exists if a reasonable onlooker would find that the listener
believes he or she will be subjected to physical violence.114
When a cross is burned in front of an individual's home, a
direct threat is communicated to the victim, who may reason-
ably believe that physical violence is likely to follow. This is
because physical violence, including lynchings and arson, have
historically accompanied cross burnings.
Threatening speech and coercive statements do not fall
within the realm of protected expression." 5 Such actions play
no part in furthering the purpose of the First Amendment,
which is to allow for uninhibited, wide-open debate of public
issues.1 6
In Kansas, a statute prohibiting cross burning in situations
where the burning constituted a terroristic threat was not
found violative of the First Amendment." 7 The court held
that while burning a cross is not a per se terroristic threat,
"surrounding facts and the relationship of the parties involved
may be such that . . . [cross burning] on the property of
another is the communication of a terroristic threat.""
s8
Similarly, a Tennessee statute that proscribed the unlaw-
ful act of willfully and maliciously burning a cross on the prop-
erty of another was also found constitutional." 9 The statute
required that the perpetrator have the intent to intimidate
another. The court stated, "Clearly, it would take a strained
construction of this statute to say the doing of this unlawful act
would be violative of one's free speech rights under the first
amendment.' 2
0
The First Amendment has never extended protection to
113. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (holding that intimidation
by threat of violence is not protected speech). See generally State v. Kepiro, 16 Wash.
App. 116, 125, 810 P.2d 19, 24 (1991).
114. United States v. Mitchell, 463 F.2d 187, 191 (8th Cir. 1972).
115. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
116. Id. at 708.
117. See State v. Miller, 629 P.2d 748 (Kan. 1981).
118. Id at 751.
119. Tennessee v. Reed, C.C.A. No. 1006 (Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Apr. 18, 1985)
(LEXIS, States library, Tenn. file).
120. Id at *3.
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threats of terror.12 ' Cross burnings in many situations consti-
tute such threats and, thus, should be freely regulable by the
government.
iii. Narrowly Construed to Fit Within the Low-Value
Speech Exception
As speech, cross burnings with the intent to intimidate or
harass should not be afforded the same value or protection as
other forms of speech. The United States Supreme Court has
assigned varying degrees of protection to different types of
speech depending on the purported social value and potential
harm of the speech.' 22 For example, obscenity receives no
First Amendment protection, 23 while commercial speech, 2 4
defamation, 25 speech in schools, 26 and speech that inflicts
intentional emotional distress'27 receive less than full First
Amendment protection.
Cross burning with the intent to intimidate or harass has
little political value. The action is perceived by the victim as a
threat or promise of future harm rather than as a communica-
tion of the principles of white supremacy. In most cross burn-
ing situations, there is no dialogue between the victim and the
perpetrator. Counter-speech is impossible because of the
directness of the intimidation. 12
Cross burning with the intent to intimidate or harass is
easily distinguishable from a political cross burning, which
should be afforded full First Amendment protection. An
example of the former conduct would be burning a cross on or
near a minority victim's property. An example of the latter
conduct would be burning a cross during a peaceful
demonstration.
The former conduct is so direct and intimidating that the
discredited message of white supremacy is not immediately
understood by the victim; there is no dialogue between the par-
121. Masson v. Slaton, 320 F. Supp. 669, 672 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
122. See Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech
Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 222 (1991).
123. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-61 (1973).
124. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557,
561-63 (1980).
125. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974).
126. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986).
127. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
128. J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to
the First Amendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 421.
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ties, and there is a likelihood that the victim will be psycholog-
ically harmed by the event."2 Furthermore, the latter conduct
is less forceful and intimidating, with the potential for counter-
speech at least existent. The message of white supremacy has
a high probability of being communicated by the cross burner,
and the viewer's slight uneasiness is outweighed by the com-
municative value of the message.
Cross burning with the intent to intimidate or harass
serves none of the policies of the First Amendment such as the
promotion of effective dialogue. The harm experienced by the
victim is great when compared with the message that he or she
ultimately understands. Therefore, cross burning with the
intent to intimidate or harass should be considered low-value
speech.
3. Overbreadth Revisited: The Reasonable Fear Standard
Overbreadth is not an issue only with regard to the terms
"intimidate" and "harass." Some argue that the wording "rea-
sonable fear" also carries the statute into "constitutionally
treacherous waters." ' Critics of the statute may argue that
the reasonable fear standard makes sanctionable some offen-
sive speech based solely on the temperamental timidity of a
victim.
The critics' argument would be true if the statute did not
mandate that the perpetrator have the intent to intimidate or
harass. Because such an intent is mandated, and because it
merely accompanies the "reasonable fear" standard, the statute
is not overly broad.
For example, the fear experienced by a Holocaust survivor
witnessing a group of neo-Nazis peacefully marching in front
of his or her house may certainly place that person in reason-
able fear. However, because the neo-Nazis' purpose was
merely to let their views be known, and perhaps even to
offend, the action is not sanctionable. To be sanctionable, the
marchers would have to intend to intimidate or harass. By
threatening, rather than offending, the marcher's conduct
would then be sanctionable.3
129. See Delgado, supra note 9, at 135-49.
130. State v. Stevens, No. 91-8-02530-6, slip op. at 7 (King County Super. Ct. Oct. 9,
1991), petititon for cert. filed, No. 58734-5 (Wash. Nov. 20, 1991).
131. See generally Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978).
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4. Is Section (1) of the Statute Impermissibly Vague?
Due process provides that citizens be given adequate notice
and adequate legal standards to preclude arbitrary enforce-
ment. 32 In light of these rights, the Washington statute has
been criticized with regard to the phrase "because of, or in a
way that is reasonably related to, associated with, or directed
toward .. .that person's race, .... ." Critics of the statute
argue that the wording is unclear with respect to the extent to
which the perpetrator must be motivated by the victim's
ethnicity. Does the victim's ethnicity have to be the sole rea-
son for the perpetrator's actions, or is it sufficient for the vic-
tim's ethnicity to merely be a contributing reason, or even
something less?'3s
The statutory language is clear. The words "because of"
contemplate that the perpetrator must be solely motivated by
the victim's ethnicity in order to be liable. Furthermore, the
phrase "in a way that is reasonably related to, associated with,
or directed toward" can be logically construed as requiring sub-
stantial motivation on the part of the perpetrator. Thus,
where a racial slur occurs during or after a heated non-racially
motivated argument, there is no criminal conduct. The slur in
this context is merely offqnsive and the victim's ethnicity is
not a substantial reason why the perpetrator acted.
The language "places another person in reasonable fear of
harm" has also been criticized on vagueness grounds.3 5 The
criticism is that because the legislature did not explicitly state
whether an objective or subjective standard was to be used,
members of the public will have to guess when their conduct
becomes criminally sanctionable.'l 6
This criticism is without merit. Washington generally uses
an objective standard in conjunction with the victim's particu-
lar situation. 3 7 The fact that a victim believes that he or she is
132. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080(1) (1989).
134. See generally Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail But
Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic
Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REv. 333, 356 (1991).
135. State v. Stevens, No. 91-8-02530-6, slip op. at 5 (King Cty. Sup. Ct. Oct. 9,
1991), petitition for cert filed, No. 58734-5 (Wash. Nov. 20, 1991).
136. Id. at 8-9.
137. See State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). In Wanrow, the
court used an objective standard, with the victim's sex, age, strength, and perceptions
also being taken into account. Thus, a mixed standard was used, with a seeming
emphasis on the victim's state of mind.
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in fear of harm is not enough. That belief must also be reason-
able."s Based on the Washington case law, there are no vague-
ness problems with reference to the "reasonable fear"
standard.
A further safeguard used to ensure that a perpetrator will
not be left guessing as to whether or not he or she violated the
statute is the mens rea requirement. The perpetrator must
intend to intimidate or harass.13
Because Washington uses a mixed objective-subjective
standard, and because the perpetrator must intend his or her
actions, there can be no doubt that this portion of the statute is
clear.
B. Analysis of Section (2)(a)
Section (2)(a) of the malicious harassment statute contains
an irrebuttable presumption that makes cross burning a per se
violation of the statute."4 Upon proof of cross burning, a
defendant is conclusively presumed to have committed all of
the elements of the crime, and the trier of fact must find the
defendant guilty of the crime, regardless of the actual facts of
the case.141
A conclusive irrebuttable presumption, such as the one at
issue here, is not constitutionally permissible because it
relieves the prosecution of its burden of proof.'4 The conclu-
sive irrebuttable presumption in the Washington statute is not
only overbroad because it encompasses a substantial amount of
protected conduct, 43 but because it also violates due process.'"
Section (2)(a) of the statute is not subject to a limiting con-
struction and should be changed by the legislature. Cross
burning, for example, may be prima facie evidence that the
crime of malicious harassment occurred. Using the cross burn-
ing as prima facie evidence would simply shift the burden of
proof to the perpetrator. The alleged perpetrator would not,
138. Id
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080(1) (1989).
140. Id. § 9A.36.080(2)(a).
141. See Sandstrom v Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523-24 (1979).
142. Id
143. For example, cross burning in one's own home or during a peaceful march is
protected conduct that would be considered violative of the malicious harassment
statute if the conclusive presumption were applied.
144. See generally Sandetrom, 442 U.S. 510.
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therefore, be found to have conclusively violated the statute
merely upon a showing that a cross had been burned.
IV. CONCLUSION
Washington's malicious harassment has been, and will con-
tinue to be, subject to criticisms concerning overbreadth and
vagueness. A definitive stance on both issues should be taken
by Washington courts so as to eliminate the present
uncertainty.
Regarding the issue of overbreadth, Washington courts
will have to determine whether cross burning with the intent
to intimidate or harass is expressive conduct. Such conduct, as
stated before, should not be construed as "speech." Rather, the
perpetrator's actions should be recognized as threats or
promises of violence. Under this theory, Section (1) of Wash-
ington's malicious harassment statute would clearly survive an
overbreadth challenge. This is because only nonspeech would
be regulated.
Despite the preceding argument, Washington courts may
find that the residual message of white supremacy conveyed
during certain cross burning situations is "speech" under the
First Amendment. Despite this finding, however, cross burn-
ing with the intent to intimidate or harass can nevertheless be
regulated as fighting words, threatening speech, or low-value
speech. Accordingly, Section (1) of the statute would remain
constitutional.
Regarding the vagueness issues, Washington's malicious
harassment statute should not run into problems. Perpetrators
will not have to guess as to whether or not their actions are
sanctionable, because a logical reading of the statute provides
that the perpetrator must have been at least substantially
motivated to act by the victim's ethnicity. Likewise, the "rea-
sonable fear" language does not pose problems, because Wash-
ington has traditionally used a mixed objective-subjective
standard in situations where the legislature has not been
explicit.
Although constitutional problems do not exist with regard
to Section (1) of the statute, Section (2)(a) is unconstitutional
because it is overly broad and because it violates the perpetra-
tor's right to due process. Section (2)(a) needs to be either
deleted or limited. For example, by changing the wording of
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the section from "per se" to "prima facie evidence," the legisla-
ture would eliminate the constitutional deficiencies.
There is a tremendous need for a malicious harassment
statute in Washington.' 45 The majority of Washington's statute
is constitutional as written, and the unconstitutional portions
can be easily remedied. Hopefully, with meritorious criticisms
being taken into account, Washington's malicious harassment
statute can continue to lend protection to victims of hateful
intimidation and harassment.
145. "The failure of the legal system to redress the harms of racism, and of racial
insults, conveys to all the lesson that egalitarianism is not a fundamental principle; the
law, through inaction, implicitly teaches that respect for individuals is of little
importance." Delgado, supm note 9, at 141.
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